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Introduction
Imagine a situation in which a well-known U.S. chain-perhaps whose
logo with golden arches, an apple with a bite taken from its right side, or a
red bull's-eye has been seared into Americans' consciousness and is inter-
nationally recognizable-decides to open more branches abroad.' The
chain seeks out foreign investors and, seeing a prime opportunity despite
local opposition, begins negotiations with potential partners in the Middle
East. During these negotiations, the chain insists that the foreign branch
imitate other stores of the U.S. chain as closely as possible to maintain the
integrity of its brand internationally. The deal is worth millions, and con-
sequently the parties spend significant time ironing out the numerous
details, among them the prominence of the chain's logo, the interior design
of the business space, minimum revenue requirements, and other factors
common to all branches of the chain worldwide.
Imagine further that when drafting the agreement between the chain
and the investors, the parties agree to submit any disputes arising from the
transaction to international commercial arbitration rather than leaving dis-
pute resolution to a court.2 However, although the parties call in numer-
1. The fact pattern in the hypothetical is based on Alghanim & Sons, which involved
a dispute over several Middle Eastern branches of the U.S. toy store chain Toys "R" Us.
See Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 17-18 (2d
Cir. 1997). Facts have been added, deleted, and altered for the purposes of this
hypothetical.
2. Submitting disputes to international commercial arbitration is not out of the
ordinary in cross-border transactions. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS & SCH. OF INT'L
ARBITRATION, QUEEN MARY, UNIV. OF LONDON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE
ATTITUDES AND PRACTICEs 2006 2 (2006), available at http://www.pwc.be/en -BE/be/pub-
lications/ia-study-pwc-06.pdf [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE Arri-
TUDES AND PRACTICES 2006] (finding that 73% of respondents in an empirical study
researching the views of leading corporations towards the use of international commer-
cial arbitration to resolve cross-border disputes use international commercial arbitration
as either the sole dispute resolution mechanism or in concert with other mechanisms).
Companies conducting cross-border business select international commercial arbitra-
tion as their preferred method of dispute resolution mainly due to the flexibility and
autonomy inherent in the arbitration process. See id. at 6 (citing "[fllexibility of proce-
dure" as arbitration's most widely recognized advantage and referring to autonomy by
noting that "[tlhe active participation of the parties in determining and shaping the
procedure inspires confidence in the process."); see also Peter Behrens, Arbitration as an
Instrument of Conflict Resolution in International Trade: Its Basis and Limits, in CONFLICT
RESOLUTION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A Symposium 14 (Daniel Friedmann & Ernst-Joa-
chim Mestmacker, eds. 1993) ("[A]rbitration roots in the principle of party autonomy.");
infra Part I.A. Furthermore, these arbitration cases are often worth millions of dollars.
In 2010, the amount in dispute was under $1 million in only 24.1% of new arbitration
cases before the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris. See Int'l Ct. of Arbitra-
tion, Facts and Figures on ICC Arbitration - 2010 Statistical Report, INT'L CHAMBER COM.
(Feb. 2011), http://iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/index.html?id=41190.
724 Vol. 45
2012 Incompetent Drafting and Complex Laws
ous lawyers with the relevant expertise to work out the provisions relating
to international taxation, foreign employment laws and such, when it
comes to the arbitration clause the parties spend barely any time negotiat-
ing the arbitration details. Instead, in accordance with popular practice,
they insert into the agreement a short and simple standard arbitration
clause recommended by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC):
"All disputes arising out of or in connection with the present contract shall
be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Cham-
ber of Commerce by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with
the said Rules."3 The parties do, however, specifically agree that any arbi-
tration shall occur in the United States, believing that the venue will be fair
and efficient for both parties.
The parties sign the agreement and the branches in the Middle East
begin operation. One day the CEO of the U.S. chain visits these branches
and sees that they in no way mirror the U.S. chain. Specifically, the logo -
those famous golden arches or perhaps the celebrated apple with a bite
taken from its right side-is not clearly and respectfully displayed, the stan-
dards of the branches do not mirror those of the U.S. chain, and the reve-
nues are pitiful. The CEO, concerned about the harm this will do to the
brand's international reputation, demands that the branch fulfill the
requirements of the agreement. The branch fails to do so, and, after futile
communication between the parties and mounting political tension in the
Middle East, the frustrated U.S. chain terminates the agreement and looks
for new investors. Consequently, the Middle Eastern investors submit the
issue to arbitration, and, in accordance with the agreement, the parties
arbitrate in the United States. Unfortunately, during the arbitration pro-
ceedings, the U.S. chain is not given a full and fair chance to be heard. At
the close of these flawed proceedings, the arbitrators award the Middle
Eastern branches $40 million in damages for breach of contract.
The U.S. chain, unhappy with the arbitrators' decision, subsequently
seeks to have the award set aside in a U.S. court on the ground that the
arbitration proceedings were flawed. If the U.S. chain were to succeed in
its quest, it would not have to pay damages and the award would be nulli-
fied. Now imagine that, much to the surprise of the U.S. chain and its
lawyers, U.S. law in the circuit where the U.S. chain is seeking set-aside
does not, in fact, allow parties to set aside an arbitral award. In that case,
the potential difference in cost between choosing to arbitrate in one circuit
over another would be $40 million based on the set-aside alone. Had the
lawyers been aware of this difference in the circuits' laws, they would have,
at the time of drafting the clause, chosen to arbitrate in a circuit where set-
aside is possible. Instead, the U.S. chain is now stuck paying $40 million
in damages with no recourse, simply because (1) the lawyers did not fore-
see the consequences of the different circuits' interpretations of a complex
3. See Int'l Ct. of Arbitration, Standard ICC Arbitration Clause, INT'L CHAMBER COM.
(Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/id4090/index.html.
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body of law and (2) they did not think through the details and conse-
quences of the arbitration clause.
This hypothetical-and the U.S. chain's plight over a complicated and
unexpected law for which lawyers do not account when drafting the arbi-
tration clause-is not completely improbable. Indeed, this Note argues that
a circuit split between the Second and Eleventh Circuits-perhaps uninten-
tionally and certainly unforeseeably-leaves parties vulnerable to an auto-
matic waiver of the right to set aside an arbitration award. This means that
by choosing to arbitrate in the Eleventh Circuit, parties may automatically
eliminate the opportunity for the losing party to oppose the confirmation
of the award in court; effectively, the court stamps its approval on the
award as is. Conversely, in the Second Circuit parties are able to petition
to have an award set aside in court. This Note recommends that the circuit
split be resolved to eliminate the possibility of an automatic waiver of set-
aside rights because such a law would be incompatible with U.S. and inter-
national set-aside waiver law and policy. Further, this Note recommends
that even if the circuit split were resolved in this way, the United States
should modernize its set-aside waiver law to allow provisions waiving set-
aside in arbitration clauses. Such a change would promote autonomy in
international commercial arbitration in the United States, in addition to
increasing the attractiveness of the country as a seat of arbitration.
Part I of this Note outlines the basics of international commercial arbi-
tration and the legal framework regarding set-aside in the United States.
More importantly, Part I illustrates a circuit split between the Second and
Eleventh Circuits. Specifically, according to the Second Circuit's interpre-
tation of the New York Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act, the
primary vehicles governing international commercial arbitration in the
United States, parties arbitrating in the Second Circuit are able to petition
a court to set aside an arbitration award. On the contrary, the Eleventh
Circuit's interpretation of the same laws does not allow parties to seek to
have an award set aside in court. Regardless of whether the set-aside
effects arising from the circuits' interpretations of the laws are uninten-
tional, from the perspective of our U.S. chain, the chain's decision whether
to arbitrate in New York, NY, Atlanta, GA, or Miami, FL affects whether the
chain can petition the court to set aside the $40 million award that was the
result of faulty arbitration proceedings.
Part II of this Note recommends that courts resolve the circuit split in
favor of the Second Circuit's rule, which does not leave parties like the U.S.
chain vulnerable to an automatic waiver of set-aside. This recommendation
is based on an analysis of the policies surrounding set-aside waiver law in
different jurisdictions-specifically the policy of protection in the United
States and the policy of autonomy in several European jurisdictions-and
the observation that the concept of an automatic waiver is incompatible
with both policies.
The Note concludes by recommending that even if a court resolved the
circuit split to eliminate the possibility of automatic waiver, the United
States should modernize its set-aside waiver laws to allow parties to con-
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tractually waive set-aside. Current U.S. law does not allow parties such
flexibility, and this Note argues that modernizing the U.S. law would be
more compatible with the principle of autonomy and freedom of contract
that otherwise pervades U.S. arbitration law. In addition, such renewed
focus on autonomy would make the United States a more attractive seat for
arbitration and would make U.S. arbitration law more accessible to both
American and foreign lawyers.
I. Background
A. The Benefits of Including an Arbitration Clause in Agreements for
Cross-Border Transactions
It is not uncommon for parties like our U.S. chain and the internation-
ally located branches -parties engaged in lucrative cross-border transac-
tions-to contract for international commercial arbitration to be the
method of dispute resolution. These parties choose international commer-
cial arbitration because of the benefits of arbitration compared to litiga-
tion.4 Specifically, the U.S. chain and the international branch would
prefer international commercial arbitration because they see huge benefits
in the flexibility and autonomy of the procedure that arises from their abil-
ity to choose the location, the arbitrators,5 and rules of arbitration that are
less formal and rigid than those mandated by, for example, the United
States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the French Code de Procedure
Civile.6 In our hypothetical, the U.S. chain and the investors chose the
rules that govern their proceedings in a simple way by defaulting to an
already existing set of rules-here the ICC rules-because the rules suited
4. See, e.g., COVINGTON & BURLING, A PRIMER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1
(1998) (providing a basic overview of issues involved in the practice of international
commercial arbitration). Note that while enforceability and finality of awards are con-
sidered benefits of arbitration, some commentators are concerned that, unlike litigated
disputes, arbitration awards cannot be efficiently appealed. Specifically, although disap-
pointed parties can challenge arbitration awards to be set aside by a court, the process is
difficult and challenging given the deference that courts show to arbitration. See id.;
Harout Jack Samra, Two to Tango: Domestic Grounds for Vacatur Under the New York Con-
vention, 20 AM. REV. INT'L. ARB. 367, 373 (2009) (discussing federal arbitration policy in
the United States); Richard Stim, The Benefits of Arbitration, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Jan. 10, 2006), http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/tips/archives/2006/01/arbi-
tration is.html (providing practical advice to business owners). But see William H.
Knull, III & Noah D. Rubins, Betting the Farm on International Arbitration: Is it Time to
Offer an Appeal Option?, 11 Am. REV. INT'L ARB. 531 (2000) (arguing that the finality of
awards is not necessarily a benefit of arbitration and suggesting that it is time to create
an appeals mechanism for arbitration). Such a struggle in court can also be disap-
pointing and frustrating to parties, who originally chose arbitration specifically to avoid
a struggle in court.
5. See INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 2006, supra
note 2, at 2; see also INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN NEw YORK 3-4 (J. Stew-
art McClendon & Rosabel E. Everard Goodman eds., 1986) (discussing the advantages
of international commercial arbitration).
6. See, e.g., COVINGTON & BURLING, supra note 4, at 1.
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their needs. Alternatively, the parties could have also written every rule
from scratch had they deemed it necessary.7
The U.S. chain and the international investors may also prefer to arbi-
trate because of the comparative ease of enforcing arbitral awards.8 Com-
mentators have noted that arbitral awards are more easily enforced than
court judgments in international cases because enforcement of arbitral
awards is governed by international treaty in contrast to enforcement of
foreign court judgments, which relies on principles of international comity
that are frequently cumbersome.9 Adding to the ease of enforcing awards
is the current pro-arbitration sentiment prevalent in courts, with courts
exhibiting a "highly deferential [attitude] to arbitration in general . . . ."10
This sentiment is attractive to parties like the U.S. chain and its interna-
tional investors, who certainly would prefer to reap the gains of any dam-
ages awarded to them as quickly and with as little legal maneuvering as
possible.
Arguably, in choosing arbitration over litigation, the U.S. chain and
the international investors might be concerned with some of the disadvan-
tages associated with arbitration: the length of the arbitration process from
filing to award, the expense of the process, the risk of national court inter-
vention in the arbitration process, and the problems associated with join-
ing third parties to the process." Commentators have also expressed
concerns that arbitration is not as predictable as litigation.' 2 However, for
the U.S. chain and the international investors-as for many other parties
negotiating cross-border transactions-the benefits of arbitration outweigh
the possible disadvantages.
B. The Role of Set-Aside Within the Process of International
Commercial Arbitration
Set-aside, the topic of this Note, becomes a concern to the U.S. chain
and the international investors towards the end of the arbitration process.
The process of arbitration begins when a breach of contract claim arises
7. See generally INT'L TRADE CTR., ARBITRATION AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION: How TO SETTLE INTERNATIONAL BUSINEss DISPUTES 131-49 (2001) (noting that par-
ties may rely on standard clauses that arbitration institutions draft, but also
enumerating various elements-categorized essential, useful, and other-that the parties
can choose to include to tailor their clause).
8. See INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 2006, supra
note 2, at 2.
9. See, e.g., COVINGTON & BURLING, supra note 4, at 4. Contra Charles Adams, The
State of Arbitration, GLOBAL ARB. REv. (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.globalarbitration
review.com/journal/article/30392/the-state-arbitration/ (observing that today many are
under the impression that international arbitration has become "unnecessarily
cumbersome").
10. Samra, supra note 4, at 373.
11. See INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPoRATE ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 2006, supra
note 2, at 2.
12. See Knull & Rubins, supra note 4, at 532-33 (commenting on the experience of a
European lawyer who had "'exposed [his client's] company to the unpredictability of an
arbitral award"').
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and the perturbed parties submit the issue to arbitration pursuant to the
arbitration clause that the U.S. chain and the international investors
included in their agreement.' 3 A panel of arbitrators, also referred to as
the arbitration tribunal, hears arguments and evidence from both parties
and subsequently renders an arbitral award that is generally binding on the
parties involved.' 4 If a court recognizes and enforces the arbitral award in
accordance with the national laws and international treaties of the country
where the enforcement is sought, the losing party then has to pay damages
to its opponent-these damages can be in the millions, as in our hypotheti-
cal where the Middle Eastern branches were awarded $40 million.15 How-
ever, when the losing party is dissatisfied with the award-and in our
hypothetical the U.S. chain has every reason to be dissatisfied with paying
$40 million in damages where it believes the arbitration procedure was
unfair-the party may seek to have the award set aside by the court in the
country where the award was rendered.16 National laws determine the
courts in which the parties can bring set-aside proceedings: in the United
States, parties can do so in a district court in the jurisdiction where the
arbitration occurred.' 7
Setting aside an award is the functional equivalent of nullifying the
award. Therefore, if the court agrees with the U.S. chain and sets aside the
award, the award would have no effect in that jurisdiction and the interna-
tional investors would have no remedy in the country where the award is
set aside.18 In our hypothetical case, the Middle Eastern investors would
not be able to collect the $40 million award in the United States if a court
sets aside the award. In such a case, the investors can still seek to have the
award recognized and enforced in another country, but that country is also
entitled to refuse to do so based on the foreign court's decision to set aside
the award.' 9 Furthermore, even if the award were enforced in another
country, in the absence of significant U.S. chain assets in the country there
is no guarantee that Middle Eastern investors will be able to collect the full
$40 million. 20
On the other hand, if the court does not agree with the U.S. chain and
refuses to set aside the award, the U.S. chain will have to pay the full $40
million. This would also be the case if the U.S. chain and the Middle East-
13. See, e.g., Int'l Ct. of Arbitration, supra note 3 (referring parties to the ICC rules of
arbitration).
14. See Gloria Miccoili, International Commercial Arbitration, Am. Soc'Y INT'L L.,
http://www.asil.org/erg/?page=arb (last updated Dec. 1, 2012).
15. See New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards art. III, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New
York Convention].
16. See, e.g., INT'L TRADE CTR., supra note 7, at 111.
17. See Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006). Note that "vacate"
refers to set-aside.
18. See, e.g., INT'L TRADE CTR., supra note 7, at 113.
19. See generally RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN KAPLAN & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, CIVIL
PROCEDURE: MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE 493 -508 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 10th ed.
2010) (discussing jurisdiction over things).
20. See generally id.
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ern investors had contractually waived their right to have the award set
aside in the agreement, thus effectively eliminating the right to appeal the
arbitrator's decision and leaving the losing party, here the U.S. chain, stuck
with an unfavorable $40 million award.2 ' The role of set-aside, therefore, is
crucial in arbitration proceedings because it affects the finality of the arbi-
tral award.
C. The Legal Framework for Setting Aside an Award in the United
States
In setting aside an award in the United States, the U.S. chain and the
Middle Eastern investors are subject to complex laws. As in most coun-
tries, in the United States international commercial arbitration is governed
by both a federal statute, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 22 and an inter-
national treaty, the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention).23 Arbitration is
thus subject to the interplay between the two sources of law.2 4
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925, which generally governs arbitra-
tion in the United States. In Chapter 1, the FAA provides the process for
enforcing an arbitral award25 and the procedure and grounds for setting
aside an award. 26 Specifically, a district court in the district where the
award is made can order the arbitral award to be set aside in situations
where the award or the process of arbitration is deemed to be unfair or
defective.2 7 For example, corruption, fraud, arbitrator misconduct, and
partiality constitute grounds for setting aside an arbitration award under
§ 10 of the FAA. 28 Furthermore, courts in the United States have recog-
nized additional, non-statutory grounds for setting aside an arbitral award,
but "this doctrine is presently in flux."29
Chapter 2 of the FAA incorporates the New York Convention, enacted
at a 1958 ICC conference designed to address the demands of post-WWII
increased international trade,30 provides broad guidelines on how courts
should apply the convention. 3' There are two important aspects to the
applicability of the New York Convention to any given award. First, the
FAA states that any award or agreement that is "considered as commercial"
21. See, e.g., INT'L TRADE CTR., supra note 7, at 149.
22. Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006). Note that the Federal
Arbitration Act applies to both domestic and international arbitration.
23. New York Convention, supra note 15.
24. See Samra, supra note 4, at 367-90.
25. See id. at 368; see also 9 U.S.C. § 9.
26. See 9 U.S.C. § 10.
27. See id.; see also Samra, supra note 4, at 367-90.
28. See 9 U.S.C. § 10; see also Samra, supra note 4, at 368-69.
29. Samra, supra note 4, at 369 (discussing the "'manifest disregard"' of the law
standard as a controversial and circuit split-causing ground for setting aside an award).
30. See Richard W. Hulbert, The Case for a Coherent Application of Chapter 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act, 22 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 45, 52 (2011) (discussing the history of
the New York Convention).
31. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08; see also Samra, supra note 4, at 369.
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falls under the New York Convention.3 2 However, the FAA also "carves out
an important exception"33 to this, demanding an international component
to the dispute before the case will be deemed to fall under the New York
Convention.34 Second, the New York Convention applies to the "recogni-
tion and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State
other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards
are sought . .. [and] to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards
in the State where their recognition and enforcement are sought."35 The
precise definition of "award not considered as domestic" (non-domestic
award) has received considerable attention in the United States.36
Although the title of the New York Convention refers to "foreign awards,"
U.S. courts have determined that the New York Convention applies to arbi-
tral awards that have been rendered in the United States if they qualify as
"non-domestic."37 However, for these foreign and non-domestic awards
rendered in the United States, as this Note discusses below, courts are split
32. 9 U.S.C. § 202; see also Samra, supra note 4, at 369.
33. Samra, supra note 4, at 369.
34. 9 U.S.C. § 202 states the following:
An agreement or award arising out of such a relationship which is entirely
between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the Con-
vention unless that relationship involves property located abroad, envisages per-
formance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with
one or more foreign states. For the purpose of this section a corporation is a
citizen of the United States if it is incorporated or has its principal place of
business in the United States.
35. New York Convention, supra note 15, art. 1(1).
36. See Samra, supra note 4, at 371.
37. See, e.g., Bergesen v.Joseph Muller Co., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983). How-
ever, commentators have met such court decisions with criticism, suggesting that the
courts have expanded the scope of the convention. See Samra, supra note 4, at 371.
Academic commentators especially have criticized U.S. courts for interpreting this provi-
sion of Article 1 of the New York Convention too broadly by applying it to cases where
arbitration occurs in the United States. See Albert Jan van den Berg, When is an Arbitral
Award Nondomestic Under the New York Convention of 1958?, 6 PACE L. REV. 25, 46
(1985); see also Samra, supra note 4, at 371 (discussing van den Berg's argument). Crit-
ics especially point to the Second Circuit decision in Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Co. that
an arbitral award awarded in a dispute in the United States between two foreign entities
falls under the New York Convention's category of "[arbitral] awards 'not considered as
domestic."' Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 932; van den Berg, supra; Samra, supra note 4, at 371
(discussing Bergesen). These critics have noted that such a decision makes the United
States a "more hospitable forum for foreign parties intending to arbitrate within the
United States" because their awards are more likely to be enforced in federal courts: the
enforcement of an award under Chapter 1 is "almost automatic" because enforcement
can be avoided only through a set-aside action, while under Chapter 2 enforcement "can
be resisted on a number of grounds" which, admittedly, closely correspond to set-aside
grounds in many national arbitration statutes. van den Berg, supra, at 50, 54-55; see
Samra, supra note 4, at 371. Compare these criticisms, however, to one academic's state-
ment that it took over a decade for courts to decide whether the New York Convention
applies to awards rendered in the U.S., "[djespite the unambiguous language of [§] 202
and the specific references in the venue and enforcement provisions of [§§] 204 and 206
to arbitrations in the United States . . . ." Hulbert, supra note 30, at 59.
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on whether both Chapters 1 and 2 are available for the parties to scrutinize
the award in U.S. courts.38
Article V of the New York Convention provides grounds under which
"recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused." 39 For exam-
ple, Article V permits such an action if there is evidence that the agreement
was invalid, parties were not given proper notice, the award does not fall
under the scope of the issue the parties presented for arbitration, the arbi-
tration procedure did not reflect party agreement, the award has been set
aside, the award considers subject matter that is unarbitrable under the
enforcing country's laws, or the award is contrary to public policy.40 This
list of grounds for refusing to enforce an award set forth in Article V is
exhaustive, and courts cannot read other grounds into the convention by
implication.41
Although both Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 of the FAA refer to situations
in which courts might not enforce an award, it is important to note that
only Chapter 1 provides the grounds for, and thus the right to, set-aside in
U.S. law.4 2 The language in the New York Convention-"recognition and
enforcement of the award may be refused" 43-does not refer to set-aside,
but simply enumerates circumstances in which a court may refuse to
enforce a foreign or non-domestic award.44 The two concepts are not inter-
changeable: only a court in the country where or under whose laws an
award is rendered can set aside an award,4 5 while courts in both the coun-
try where the award was rendered and in other countries where enforce-
ment is sought can refuse recognition and enforcement.46 That the two
concepts are not interchangeable is evident in that Article V(1)(e) of the
New York Convention allows for a court to refuse to enforce a foreign
award if it "has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of
the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made."47
The distinction between a court setting aside an award and a court refusing
38. See infra Part I.D.
39. New York Convention, supra note 15, arts. V(1)-(2).
40. Id.
41. See DOMENICo Di PIETRO & MARTIN PLATTE, ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBI-
TRATION AwARDs: THE NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1958 135 (2001) (noting that case law,
leading authorities in the field of international commercial arbitration, and the conven-
tion's "pro-enforcement bias" all support the proposition that the list of grounds on
which to set aside an award is exhaustive); see also Samra, supra note 4, at 371.
42. Compare New York Convention, supra note 15, art. V (refusal to recognize and
enforce), with 9 U.S.C. § 10 (set-aside). See also van den Berg, supra note 37, at 55-56
("[A]n action for the enforcement [under the New York Convention] is essentially differ-
ent from an action for the setting aside of an award. . . . [T]his distinction is clearly
made by the Convention itself.").
43. New York Convention, supra note 15, arts. V(1)-(2).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id. Specifically, a court can refuse recognition and enforcement of an award
rendered in its own jurisdiction if the award is considered foreign or non-domestic, thus
falling under Article V of the New York Convention. See Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Co.,
710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983).
47. New York Convention, supra note 15, art. V(1)(e).
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to recognize and enforce an award is important because if a court sets aside
an award, the award is effectively cancelled in that jurisdiction; 8 however
if a court refuses to recognize and enforce the award, the parties can seek to
have the award enforced elsewhere. 49 The difficult distinction between
FAA Chapters 1 and 2 regarding set-aside is not the only cause for confu-
sion in U.S. courts reviewing arbitral awards. Reconciling the FAA provi-
sions regarding set-aside with the New York Convention's provisions
appears to be a "rather complex" challenge.50
That there is confusion in courts regarding set-aside law is cause for
concern. It is true that given the deference that courts show arbitration,
very few arbitral awards are set aside and the process is challenging.51 It is
also true that parties like our U.S. chain and international investors specifi-
cally contract for arbitration knowing the benefits as well as the risks.
However, this does not mean that the risks of arbitration should be ignored
and that the parties should not have the opportunity to appeal. After all,
the grounds enumerated in the FAA for setting aside an award-such as
arbitrator partiality, misconduct, fraud, and arbitrator misconduct 52-are
certainly procedural defects that, were they present during litigation,
would create cause for an appeal. For our hypothetical U.S. chain that gets
an unfavorable award following an unfair arbitration procedure, confusion
in set-aside law is certainly not preferable, as the chain would want the
decision set aside. Unfortunately, in the United States the confusion in set-
aside law is especially problematic because circuit courts have interpreted
set-aside law in different ways, leading to potential problems that parties'
lawyers do not foresee. Specifically, a circuit split between the Second and
Eleventh Circuits regarding the interpretation of the interplay between FAA
Chapters 1 and 2 gives rise to an automatic waiver of the right to set aside
an arbitration award in the Eleventh Circuit, with no such effect in the
Second Circuit and those states that follow the Second Circuit's rule.53
48. See, e.g., INT'L TRADE CTR., supra note 7, at 113. But see Chromalloy Aeroservices
v. Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907, 914 (D.D.C. 1996) (holding that, under certain circum-
stances, U.S. courts could recognize and enforce an award that Egyptian courts had set
aside).
49. See New York Convention, supra note 15, art. V (stating that actions for recogni-
tion and enforcement are not limited to one such action).
50. Samra, supra note 4, at 372-73 (noting that the cumulative effects of the provi-
sions in the Federal Arbitration Act and New York Convention have indirectly caused
confusion in courts); see also infra Part I.D.
51. See Samra, supra note 4, at 373 (discussing deference); Lawrence R. Mills et al.,
Vacating Arbitration Awards, Disp. RESOL. MAG. 23, 24 (Summer 2005) (finding that only
about 14% of all successfully filed challenges to an arbitration award resulted in the
court vacating the award); see also COVINGTON & BURLING, supra note 4, at I (noting that
a disadvantage of arbitration is that awards are "difficult to challenge effectively").
52. See Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006).
53. See TIBOR VARADY, JOHN J. BARCELO & ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 771 (4th ed. 2009) (suggesting
that this particular circuit split would lead to such an outcome).
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D. A Circuit Split Causing Unforeseen Legal Complications
In the United States, courts have struggled with the question of
whether both Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 of the FAA are available for parties
to scrutinize an arbitral award where the arbitration occurred in the United
States and the award is considered foreign or non-domestic, thus making
the New York Convention applicable. This struggle has culminated in a
circuit split, where the Second Circuit makes both Chapters 1 and 2 availa-
ble for parties in such circumstances, while the Eleventh Circuit only
makes Chapter 2 available to parties whose arbitration in the United States
resulted in a foreign or non-domestic award. Given that set-aside is only
available under Chapter 1, this circuit split has significant implications for
the parties' ability to seek to set aside an arbitral award.
1. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit considered the issue in the seminal case Yusuf
Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc. (Alghanim & Sons v.
Toys "R" Us) where it held that both Chapters 1 and 2 are available to such
parties. 54 The case involved a dispute over the termination date for a
license and technical assistance agreement and a supply agreement
between the privately held Kuwaiti business Alghanim & Sons and the U.S.
toy-store chain Toys "R" Us. 55 Following disagreements over business con-
ducted in Kuwait, the parties participated in arbitration. The arbitration
culminated in an award in favor of Alghanim & Sons that the Kuwaiti busi-
ness sought to enforce and the U.S. chain moved to set aside in protracted
litigation. 56
The Second Circuit relied on its interpretation that Chapters 1 and 2
of the Federal Arbitration Act have "'overlapping coverage'" 57 to hold that
both Chapters 1 and 2 are available to foreign parties to scrutinize an
award rendered in the United States.58 Consequently, the court deter-
mined that the New York Convention gives courts authority to apply the
FAA's grounds in Chapter 1 for setting aside an award.59 Specifically, the
54. Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 21, 23
(2d Cir. 1997).
55. Id. at 17.
56. Id. at 18. The Second Circuit quickly determined that the New York Convention
applied to the case because the arbitral award leading to the action was a non-domestic
award. Relying on FAA § 202 and Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., the court explained
that the award was non-domestic because the dispute involved two non-domestic parties
and a U.S. corporation and was mainly concerned with conduct and contract perform-
ance in the Middle East. Id. at 18-19. After concluding that the FAA provided grounds
for set-aside in the case, the Alghanim & Sons court noted that nonetheless "'the showing
required to avoid summary confirmance is high."' Id. at 23 (quoting Ottley v. Schwart-
zberg, 819 F.2d 373, 376 (2d Cir. 1987)). Consequently, the court determined that this
high bar had not been met in regards to the set-aside grounds it examined-namely
manifest disregard of the terms of the agreement and manifest disregard of the law. The
court thus refused to set aside the award. Id. at 23-25.
57. Id. at 20.
58. See id. at 21, 23; see also VAIADY, BARCELO & VON MEHREN, supra note 53, at 771.
59. See Alghanim & Sons, 126 F.3d at 21.
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court noted that under Article V of the New York Convention, U.S. courts
"are authorized to apply United States procedural arbitral law, i.e., the FAA,
to nondomestic awards rendered in the United States."60 To support its
position, the court looked to case law, commentary, and the plain language
and history of the New York Convention. 61
Importantly, the court in Alghanim & Sons v. Toys "R" Us noted that it
was the first court to consider whether "Article V(1)(e) [of the New York
Convention] authorizes an action to set aside an arbitral award under the
domestic law of the state in which, or under which, the award was ren-
dered," since it was the first court faced with a fact pattern in which the
arbitral award was rendered in the United States and the confirmation and
set-aside were both sought in the United States.62 The court emphasized
that the "[New York] Convention mandates very different regimes for the
review of arbitral awards"63 (1) in the state where, or under the laws of
which, the award was made-where domestic laws provide grounds for set-
aside; and (2) in other states where recognition and enforcement are
sought-where the New York Convention provides grounds to refuse recog-
nition and enforcement of the award.64 The crucial point here is that the
New York Convention itself does not allow for court review for the pur-
poses of set-aside-only domestic laws can allow for that, as FAA Chapter 1
does in the United States. The Alghanim v. Toys "R" Us court essentially
made such review available when the arbitration occurs in the United
States and results in a foreign or non-domestic award.65
Several circuits have followed the Second Circuit's reasoning in Alg-
hanim & Sons v. Toys "R" Us. 66 Notably, the Fifth 67 and Sixth68 Circuits
and the District of Columbia 69 have agreed that in a case where a foreign
party arbitrates in the United States, the FAA and the New York Conven-
tion make both FAA Chapters 1 and 2 available for scrutinizing the award.
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit70 takes a different approach to the overlap
60. Id. at 19-20.
61. See id. at 20-23.
62. Id. at 20-21 (noting, however, that the Seventh Circuit has "agreed, albeit in
passing, that the Convention 'contemplates the possibility of the award's being set aside
in a proceeding under local law."').
63. Id. at 23.
64. Id.
65. Compare Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006), with New York
Convention, supra note 15, art. V.
66. See Lucy Reed & Phillip Riblett, Essay, Expansion of Defenses to Enforcement of
International Arbitral Awards in U.S. Courts?, 13 Sw.J. L. & TRADE AMERICAS 121, 129-30
(2006) (discussing this particular circuit split in the context of an increase in the availa-
bility of the manifest disregard standard for setting aside arbitral awards, which is availa-
ble under FAA Chapter 1).
67. See, e.g., Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov't of Turkm., 345 F.3d 347, 365 (5th Cir. 2003).
Note that Reed & Riblett, supra note 66, list the circuits on both sides of the split.
68. See, e.g., Jacada (Eur.), Ltd. v. Int'l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 709 (6th
Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds.
69. See, e.g., Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907, 910 (D.D.C.
1996).
70. See Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434,
1441 (11th Cir. 1998); Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts, B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 267
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between the New York Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act, giving
rise to the circuit split.
2. The Eleventh Circuit
In Four Seasons Hotels and Resorts, B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A. (Four
Seasons v. Consorcio Barr), the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Florida elucidated the Eleventh Circuit's position on the
interaction between Federal Arbitration Act Chapters 1 and 2 under the
New York Convention and held that only Chapter 2 is available to foreign
parties arbitrating in the United States to scrutinize the award.71 Four Sea-
sons v. Consorcio Barr involved a dispute between the Dutch, Canadian, and
Venezuelan Four Seasons corporations (Four Seasons) and Consorcio Barr,
a Venezuelan corporation.72 Prior to the litigation in a U.S. court, the par-
ties had engaged in arbitration in Florida.73 Four Seasons had initiated the
arbitration due to breach of contract regarding hotel properties that Con-
sorcio Barr owned in Caracas, Venezuela.74 The arbitral tribunal had
awarded a partial award enjoining Consorcio Barr from pursuing litigation
against Four Seasons in Venezuelan courts.75 Despite the Tribunal's
award, Consorcio Barr filed a motion in a Venezuelan court to prevent Four
Seasons from operating a hotel that Consorcio Barr owned and Four Sea-
sons managed.76 The Venezuelan court eventually granted Consorcio
Barr's motion to suspend execution of the award and declared the sub-
stance of the award null and void.77 Consequently, in Four Seasons v. Con-
sorcio Barr, Four Seasons alleged that Consorcio Barr violated the
tribunal's award.78 In response, Consorcio Barr demanded that the U.S.
court set aside the award.79
F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1341 (S.D. Fl. 2003) (relying on Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N.
Gutehoffnungshiutte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434 (11th Cir. 1998)), overruled on other grounds
by Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts, B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 377 F.3d 1164 (11th
Cir. 2004).
71. The district court determined that the award in question was non-domestic and
therefore fell under the New York Convention. See Four Seasons, 267 F. Supp. 2d at
1339. The court noted that because the Tribunal Award applied Venezuelan law for
substantive issues and arose from a dispute between Venezuelan and other foreign enti-
ties concerning performance of a contract in Venezuela, the award was non-domestic
even though it had been rendered in Miami. See id. (citing Bergesen v. Joseph Muller
Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932-33 (2d Cir. 1983) ("We adopt the view that awards 'not con-
sidered as domestic' denotes awards which are subject to the [New York] Convention not
because made abroad, but within the legal framework of another country, e.g., pro-
nounced in accordance with foreign law or involving parties domiciled or having their
principal place of business outside the enforcing jurisdiction .. .. Had Congress desired
to exclude arbitral awards involving two foreign parties rendered within the United
States from enforcement by our courts it could readily have done so. It did not.")).





77. Id. at 1338.
78. Id. at 1337.
79. Id. at 1338-39.
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The Four Seasons v. Consorcio Barr court diverged from the Second
Circuit's analysis when analyzing the overlap between FAA Chapters 1 and
2. Specifically, the court elucidated the Eleventh Circuit's position that
only Chapter 2 is available to foreign parties who arbitrate in the United
States, as set up in Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshiitte
GmbH.80 The court analyzed that, according to Chapter 2 of the Federal
Arbitration Act, "'Chapter 1 applies to actions and proceedings brought
under this chapter to the extent that that chapter is not in conflict with this
chapter or the [New York] Convention as ratified by the United States."' 1
Furthermore, the court stated the following:
Nothing in Industrial Risk Insurers or [FAA Chapter 2] indicates that Chap-
ter 1 is capable of serving as the primary framework for confirming an
award "not considered as domestic" under the [New York] Convention ....
Rather Chapter 1 of the FAA merely augments the Convention to the extent
no conflict exists between the two instruments.82
Therefore, according to the district court, the Eleventh Circuit does not
interpret there to be any overlap between FAA Chapters 1 and 2, which
subsequently eliminates the ability of a party arbitrating in the United
States to rely on both Chapters when seeking to enforce or set aside a for-
eign or non-domestic arbitral award.8 3
3. Unforeseen Legal Complications: Automatic Waiver of Set-Aside in the
Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit's interpretation is particularly worrying for par-
ties like our U.S. chain and international investors who arbitrate in the U.S.
and are awarded either a foreign or a non-domestic award. If those parties
cannot use FAA Chapter 1 to scrutinize an award in the Eleventh Circuit,
set-aside is not available to those parties at all, as only Chapter 1 provides
for set-aside.84 Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit's rule would leave for-
eign parties that choose a city in the Eleventh Circuit as the seat of arbitra-
tion unable to set aside their award at all, in practice creating an automatic
80. In Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434
(11th Cir. 1998), the Eleventh Circuit held that the New York Convention governed a
motion to set aside an award that had been rendered in Florida, had been governed by
Florida substantive law, and had arisen from a dispute between a U.S. entity and a Ger-
man corporation. The Eleventh Circuit held that the New York Convention provided
exclusive jurisdiction because "an arbitral award made in the United States, under Amer-
ican law, falls within the purview of the New York Convention-and is thus governed by
Chapter 2 of the FAA-when one of the parties to the arbitration is domiciled or has its
principal place of business outside of the United States." Id. at 1141. Despite the hold-
ing in Industrial Risk Insurers, it was not until Four Seasons v. Consorcio Barr that the
Eleventh Circuit's rejection of FAA Chapter 1 became clear.
81. Four Seasons, F. Supp. 2d at 1340 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 208).
82. Id. at 1342.
83. See id; see also VARADY, BARCELO & VON MEHREN, supra note 53, at 771 (noting
this specific circuit split and its potential consequences).
84. Compare 9 U.S.C. § 10 with New York Convention, supra note 15, art. V.
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waiver of the FAA-provided right to have an arbitration award set aside.85
This is the functional equivalent of waiving the right to appeal a court deci-
sion.8 6 Interestingly, such a case has not yet been heard in the Eleventh
Circuit,8 7 and it is likely that the automatic waiver is simply an unintended
consequence88 of the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the FAA. None-
theless, the circuit split leaves unlucky parties-like our U.S. chain with an
unfavorable $40 million award-potentially unable to even seek to have an
award set aside depending on whether their hastily agreed-upon arbitration
clause lists Atlanta, GA or New York, NY as the seat of arbitration.89
II. Analysis
A. Confusing Laws and Incompetent Arbitration Clause Drafting: A
Pressing Need to Resolve the Circuit Split
Complexities in the law are nothing new; neither are circuit splits that
require lawyers to research the law in different jurisdictions. With the issue
of set-aside in international commercial arbitration, however, the circuit
split-and the resulting complexity in the law-is especially dangerous
because many decisions relating to arbitration are made hastily at the time
of drafting the arbitration clause,9o yet have far reaching consequences.
One of these often hastily made decisions is choosing where the arbitration
will occur-called the "seat of arbitration"-and for parties arbitrating in
the United States this decision can affect whether parties can set aside an
award. Indeed, for parties like the U.S. chain and the international inves-
tors in our hypothetical, the practical reality of poor strategic planning and
awareness when drafting arbitration clauses, combined with an unex-
pected waiver of set-aside, creates a recipe for disaster in the form of unde-
sirable and irreversible awards worth millions. Therefore, it is crucial to
resolve the circuit split between the Second and Eleventh Circuits.
Admittedly, zealous proponents of arbitration might argue that parties
like our U.S. chain have the resources to hire sophisticated lawyers and
85. See VARADY, BARCELO & VON MEHREN, supra note 53, at 771 (suggesting that the
result of this particular circuit split is an automatic waiver in the Eleventh Circuit). Note
that parties must seek to have an award set aside in a district court in the district where
the arbitration occurred, see 9 U.S.C. § 10, and consequently any party who arbitrates in
a city in the Eleventh Circuit is subject to the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the
overlap between FAA Chapters 1 and 2.
86. See generally INT'L TRADE CTR., supra note 7, at 111-13 (discussing set-aside in
general); JONES DAY, COMMENTARY: ARBITRATION IN FRANCE: THE 2011 REFORM (2011),
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/b9ce7786-7e7e-47b9-a628-bc2a9361e704/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/d609618d-63cc-43e9-aOe7-bc6ae3b7663e/Arbitra-
tion%20in%20France.pdf (using "annulment" as a synonym for set-aside).
87. To qualify this statement, the author could not find that such a case had been
heard or that parties had encountered such a situation.
88. For a discussion of contractual set-aside waiver laws in the United States and the
state of contractual set-aside waiver law in the Eleventh Circuit, see infra Part II.B. 1.
89. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
90. See generally INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES
2006, supra note 2, at 10 (pointing to the "lack of attention to the negotiation of a suita-
ble international arbitration clause").
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businessmen to carefully choose the seat of arbitration with all possible
consequences in mind.91 However, in reality even sophisticated parties do
not always pay enough attention to the consequences of the choices they
make when drafting arbitration clauses-after all, they have been taught to
keep the clauses short and simple, and they often rely on standard
clauses. 92
First, parties do not always give enough credence to the tactical poten-
tial of the contents of an arbitration clause.93 A well-crafted arbitration
clause "can provide a distinct advantage,"'94 because a well-crafted clause
can allow parties to include terms that will be advantageous to those par-
ties and will safeguard the parties' interests in the event that a dispute
arises and the parties are left to resort to their dispute resolution mecha-
nism.95 Conversely, "[tihe lack of attention to the negotiation of a suitable
international arbitration clause can leave a corporation adversely exposed
should a dispute arise."96 Regardless of the tactical potential, a study by
PricewaterhouseCoopers about the practices of in-house counsel regarding
arbitration clauses found that the majority of the in-house counsel inter-
viewed in the study stated that "their corporations will concede points
when negotiating these clauses if faced with strong objections from the
counterparty."97 While the study focused on in-house counsel specifically,
academic commentators writing about lawyers generally in the context of
drafting arbitration clauses have similarly pointed to the tactical potential.
Commentators discussing the theory of procedural contracts have noted
that in circumstances where one party is more sophisticated than the
other, the sophisticated parties can "lock-in significant tactical
advantages."98
Second, and indicative of the fact that parties do not consider the tacti-
cal advantages of their arbitration clauses, parties also often do not pay
attention to the consequences of choosing the seat of arbitration. Specifi-
91. See generally Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. 852, 856 (1984) (discussing
the role of sophisticated businessmen); Patrick Gill, Note, No Do-Overs for Parties who
Agree to Limit Review of an Arbitrator's Decision, 2006 J. Disp. RESOL. 643, 654 (2006)
(discussing bargaining power).
92. See INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 2006, supra
note 2, at 11 (more corporations use standard clauses than tailored clauses); INT'L TRADE
CTR., supra note 7, at 125 (advising practitioners that the "two basic principles that
should guide any drafter of an arbitration clause are simplicity and precision" and not-
ing that "the more specific and detailed a clause is designed to be, the greater the risk of
it becoming inoperable") (emphasis omitted).
93. See INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 2006, supra
note 2, at 14.
94. See id. at 10.
95. See id.; see generally Gill, supra note 91, at 654-55 (discussing bargaining power
in the context of negotiating arbitration clauses).
96. See INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 2006, supra
note 2, at 10.
97. See id. (noting that of the in-house counsel interviewed in 2006, 60% made this
statement).
98. See Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Procedure, 94
MARQ. L. REv. 1103, 1104-05 (2011) (discussing a 1996 argument by Paul Carrington
and Paul Haagen).
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cally, the PricewaterhouseCoopers study found that while a majority of in-
house counsel considered legal considerations to be the most important
factor when choosing a seat for arbitration, the concern of convenience was
a close second.99 Consequently, the study noted that
The fact that many in-house counsel see the choice of seat as more a matter
of convenience than of concern with legal issues might suggest that some do
not fully appreciate the significance of choosing the right seat for interna-
tional arbitration. It may not be clear to some in-house counsel that the
choice of seat is a tactical decision that can help them achieve the best out-
come for their side.' 00
The fact that parties drafting arbitration clauses may not realize the
significance of choosing the right seat can have drastic consequences in the
circuit split between the Second and Eleventh Circuits. Specifically, if the
parties choose the seat to be in the United States-one of the most popular
seats'0 1 -they can only apply for set-aside in U.S. courts. If the Eleventh
Circuit applies the automatic waiver, choosing whether to arbitrate in a
circuit where set-aside is automatically waived is in itself a tactical advan-
tage: had our hypothetical U.S. chain anticipated losing the arbitration and
being liable for $40 million in damages, strategically speaking it should not
have chosen to arbitrate in the Eleventh Circuit. However, recognizing the
tactical advantage and avoiding the pitfall requires lawyers who are aware
of the difference in the law between the two jurisdictions. Furthermore, in
the circuit split the legal considerations certainly outweigh convenience;
after all, whether a party like our U.S. chain can successfully set aside an
award might come down to whether the parties arbitrated in Atlanta, GA,
or New York, NY. For the U.S. chain, the possibility of being unable to
challenge the $40 million award would outweigh the potentially greater
convenience of the Eleventh Circuit location.
It is possible that parties fail to consider the tactical advantages and
the consequences of the seat simply because they are used to relying on
standard and simple arbitration clauses. The International Bar Association
recommends that lawyers use standard clauses as a starting point, empha-
sizing that lawyers should add to the standard clause to tailor it to best suit
the client's purpose and needs.102 However, of the in-house counsel partic-
ipating in the PricewaterhouseCoopers survey, nearly half claimed to use
standard clauses, while slightly fewer in-house counsel choose to tailor the
99. See INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 2006, supra
note 2, at 14.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 3.
102. IBA GUIDELINES FOR DRAFTING INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CLAUSES, 7-8 (Int'l Bar
Ass'n 2010), available at http://www.ibanet.org/ENewsArchive/IBA_270ctober_2010
ArbitrationClausesGuidelines.aspx (noting the benefits of choosing a standard clause,
while still recommending that the standard clause be used as only a starting point).
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clauses.' 0 3 Seeing potential pitfalls with both approaches, the arbitration
experts at PricewaterhouseCoopers warn that
Standard clauses, whether recommended by arbitration institutions or
drafted by the corporation, are invariably well tested but may not suit the
circumstances of the contract under negotiation. Tailored clauses, on the
other hand, may suit business needs more precisely but arbitration experts
should be involved in the drafting as there may be pitfalls and missed oppor-
tunities when clauses are drafted by those who are unfamiliar with the arbi-
tration arena. 104
This warning about the pitfalls of arbitration clause drafting is sound,
particularly in situations such as the circuit split in question in this Note.
The state of the law is complex and-at least until the Eleventh Circuit
hears a case where it rules that the parties have automatically waived set-
aside-unexpected. Given the practical reality of poor strategic planning
and awareness when drafting arbitration clauses, combined with the uncer-
tainty regarding set-aside, the circuit split must be resolved. Otherwise, a
hypothetical like our U.S. chain's plight might become reality, but in that
reality there may be much more at stake than $40 million.
B. Resolving the Circuit Split: An Automatic Waiver Is at Odds with
Broader Policies
The circuit split should be resolved to reflect the law in the Second
Circuit. While an automatic waiver of set-aside would enforce several of
the perceived benefits of arbitration and assuage some of the concerns that
surround arbitration, it also runs contrary to the policies of protection and
autonomy that have characterized the laws relating to the waiver of set-
aside in both the United States and abroad.
Arguments in favor of an automatic waiver of the right to have an
award set aside revolve around the main advantages-namely enforceabil-
ity' 0 5 and finality' 0 6 of awards-and perceived disadvantages of arbitra-
tion-namely that the process of arbitration is lengthy' 0 7 and that national
103. See INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 2006, supra
note 2, at 10-11 (48% claimed to use standard clauses as they are, while only 43% tailor
the clauses).
104. See id. at 11; see generally INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN NEw YORK,
supra note 5, at 3-4 (discussing the advantages of international commercial arbitration).
105. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 2006,
supra note 2, at 2 (noting that one of the top reasons why in-house counsel choose
international arbitration as their preferred dispute resolution mechanism is the enforce-
ability of awards); see also COVINGTON & BURLING, supra note 4, at 1 (noting that arbitra-
tion awards are "difficult to challenge effectively," which increases enforceability).
106. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 2006,
supra note 2, at 15 (noting that "one of the main advantages associated with interna-
tional arbitration has been its finality"). The importance of finality is shown by the fact
that an overwhelming majority of in-house counsel is opposed to the creation of an
appeals mechanism for arbitration awards, because such a mechanism would make arbi-
tration "more cumbersome and litigation-likel,] ... essentially negat[ing] a key attribute
of the arbitral process." See id.
107. See id. at 7.
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courts might intervene in the process.' 08 First, automatic waiver of set-
aside clearly would increase the enforceability of awards: Section 10 of the
FAA would no longer be available to parties, so the ways that parties could
avoid enforcement would be limited to those in Article V of the New York
Convention.109 Second, automatic waiver of the right to have an award set
aside would increase the finality of awards, since the award in such a case
would be much less likely to be contested. 110 Third, waiving the right to
set-aside would assuage concerns about the lengthiness of the arbitration
process, as it would not be stretched by set-aside proceedings. Finally,
waiving set-aside would similarly assuage concerns about national court
intervention, as awards can be set aside only by courts in response to a
request for set-aside by one of the parties; if such a request is not made
because the parties have waived the right, a court will not set aside an
award.111
However, despite the reasons above supporting automatic waiver of
set-aside, the policies of protection and autonomy that have been integral to
different countries' set-aside waiver laws run against the idea of automatic
waiver." 2 It should be noted that no country has an arbitration statute
specifying that set-aside is automatically waived, and no case discusses
automatic waiver of set-aside.113 However, the issue of waiving set-aside
contractually is not novel: U.S. courts have confronted the issue,' 1 4 some
European legislatures have specifically addressed the issue in statutes," 5
and academic commentators have written about it.11 6 The policies that
apply to contractual waiver of set-aside provide an analytical framework for
the automatic waiver of set-aside. In the United States, the policy of protec-
tion has dictated set-aside waiver law, as courts have been concerned with
the danger that waiving set-aside contractually would pose to both parties
and to the courts as the final enforcers of arbitration awards.11 7 Con-
108. See id. Domestic laws that determine the level of court intervention in the pro-
ceedings vary from country to country, and "[w]hile many modem arbitration statutes
specifically limit court intervention, if the jurisdiction allows courts to intervene, there
is little an arbitration tribunal can do." See id; see also infra Part II.B-C.
109. See generally Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA), 9 U.S.C. H§ 1-16 (2006)
(enumerating the grounds under which an award can be set aside; these grounds for
avoiding having an award enforced are no longer available to parties).
110. See JONEs DAY, supra note 86.
111. See generally FAA § 10 (stating that an award can be set aside "upon the applica-
tion of any party to the arbitration").
112. See infra Part II.B-C.
113. This statement is based on the knowledge of the author after extensive research.
114. See, e.g., Hoeft v. MVL Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2003).
115. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
116. See, e.g., Thomas S. Meriwether, Comment, Limiting Judicial Review of Arbitral
Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act: Striking the Right Balance, 44 Hous. L. REv 739
(2007). Notably, the topic of limiting judicial review of arbitration awards by waiving
set-aside has received little attention from academic commentators when compared to its
counterpart: the contractual expansion of judicial review of an arbitration award. In
fact, in a 2007 comment, Thomas Meriwether noted that he could only find five articles
discussing the issue in considerable detail. See id. at 742 n.21 (2007). While the num-
ber has increased in the subsequent five years, it has not received much attention.
117. See infra Part II.B.2.
742 Vol. 45
2012 Incompetent Drafting and Complex Laws
versely, in several European countries the policy of autonomy has played a
decisive role.118 Neither of these policies, however, supports an automatic
waiver of the right to have an award set aside, and consequently the courts
should resolve the circuit split to reflect the law in the Second Circuit.
1. The Automatic Waiver Is at Odds with the U.S. Policy of Protecting the
Parties and Courts
In the United States, while the issue of automatic waiver of set-aside
has not come up in courts or in academic commentary, courts have explic-
itly shown in cases concerning the contractual waiver of set-aside that set-
aside-waiver jurisprudence is driven by a policy of protecting both the par-
ties from unfair and defective awards and the integrity of the courts. As the
U.S. policy of protection does not support contractual waiver of set-aside, it
similarly does not support an automatic waiver.
a. U.S. Case Law Emphasizes Protection
In the United States, the issue of contractually limiting judicial review
by waiving the right to have an award set aside is not codified in the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act,"l 9 and the issue has consequently been left to the
courts. The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet decided the issue, and while
the circuits are split in their interpretation of the FAA and contractual
waiver of set-aside, the circuits' decisions are driven by the policy of pro-
tecting the parties.
The prominent case on the issue is Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc.,1 20 which
was decided by the Second Circuit in 2003. In Hoeft, the court was
presented with the issue of whether the FAA allows parties to waive judicial
review of an arbitration award.121 The parties included in their arbitration
agreement a provision stating that the arbitrator's decision "shall be bind-
ing and conclusive upon each of the parties hereto and shall not be subject
to any type of review or appeal whatsoever."' 22 The Second Circuit refused
to enforce this provision because "while arbitration is a contractual crea-
tion, the judicial review of an arbitration award is not contractual in nature
and cannot be deprived by a private agreement."l 23 Consequently, and
significantly, the court held that parties cannot contractually eliminate
judicial review of an arbitration award, because there is "a floor for judicial
review of arbitration awards below which parties cannot require courts to
118. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
119. See Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 201-08 (no men-
tion of waiving set-aside).
120. See Hoeft v. MVL Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2003).
121. See id. at 60, 66; see also Meriwether, supra note 116, at 760; Mark R.
Trachtenberg & Christina F. Crozier, Risky Business: Altering the Scope ofJudicial Review
of Arbitration Awards by Contract, 69 TEX. B.J. 868, 869 (2006).
122. See Hoeft, 343 F.3d. at 60.
123. See Gill, supra note 91, at 650; see also Hoeft, 343 F.3d. at 66 (holding that judi-
cial review cannot be limited contractually).
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go, no matter how clear the parties' intentions."12 4 Several other circuits-
including the Third and Eleventh Circuits- 125agree with the Second Cir-
cuit's holding that judicial review of arbitration awards cannot be waived.
The Second Circuit's reasoning emphasized protecting the judicial
process and parties involved from the negative consequences of their agree-
ment to waive judicial review. First, the court was concerned with protect-
ing the integrity of the judicial process. 126 Specifically, the court saw the
arbitration and the judicial review processes as separate and "expressed its
fear that turning over control of judicial procedures to the parties would
compromise the integrity of the judiciary and the arbitration process as a
whole, potentially rendering the courts mere 'rubber stamps."1 27 Second,
the court was concerned with protecting the parties from unfair and defec-
tive awards.128 The court considered the FAA's set-aside standards and the
common law manifest disregard standard 29 to be "critical safeguards"
imposed by Congress and the Supreme Court.130 Specifically, the court
noted that if it were to uphold the waiver provision, then courts would be
required to enforce arbitration awards that have been "tainted by partiality,
124. See Hoeft, 343 F.3d. at 64; Trachtenberg & Crozier, supra note 121, at 869 (dis-
cussing Hoeft).
125. Similar to the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit does not allow parties to com-
pletely waive the right to set aside an arbitral award in the agreement. In Communica-
tions Consultant, Inc. v. Nextel Communities of the Mid Atlantic, Inc., the Third Circuit
considered the effect of a clause that read: "[T]he decision of the arbitrators shall be
final and unreviewable for error of law or legal reasoning of any kind and may be
enforced in any court having jurisdiction of the parties." Commc'ns Consultant, Inc. v.
Nextel Cmtys. of the Mid Atl, Inc., 146 F. App'x 550, 552 (3d Cir. 2005). Significantly,
the Third Circuit noted that although the language in the clause prevented parties from
challenging an arbitrator's legal determinations in federal court, "[in the presence of
such language, the only permissible basis upon which a litigant may challenge the
panel's award is if the litigant can show that the panel's actions were influenced by
'corruption, fraud, or partiality,' or that the panel failed to provide a hearing to consider
each party's views prior to issuing its decision." Id. at 552-53. Despite the Eleventh
Circuit's disagreement with the Second Circuit regarding the overlap between FAA
Chapters 1 and 2, it agrees with the Second Circuit in prohibiting parties from contrac-
tually waiving the right to set aside an award. In Rollins, Inc. v. Black, the Eleventh
Circuit analyzed the effects of a clause rendering an award "binding, final, and non-
appealable." See Rollins, Inc. v. Black, 167 F. App'x 798, 799 n.1 (11th Cir. 2006). The
court did not interpret such language to mean that an award could not be reviewed by a
court: although the parties could not appeal the merits of the dispute, they could still
appeal the award if the award had resulted "from an arbitrator's abuse of authority, bias,
or manifest disregard of the law." Id. See also Kim-Cl LLC v. Valent Biosciences Corp.,
756 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1265-66 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (providing an overview of different
circuits' law on contractually limiting judicial review of arbitration agreements). Even
the Tenth Circuit in Gorelick, discussed infra Part II.B. .a, noted that it would agree with
the Second Circuit if the provision had entirely eliminated judicial review of the award.
See Meriwether, supra note 116, at 765-66.
126. See Meriwether, supra note 116, at 761 (analyzing the nuances and implications
of Hoeft).
127. See id.; Hoeft, 343 F.3d. at 64.
128. See Hoeft, 343 F.3d. at 64; Meriwether, supra note 116, at 760.
129. See generally Annie Chen, The Doctrine of Manifest Disregard in the Law After Hall
Street: Implications for Judicial Review of International Arbitrations in U.S. Courts, 32
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1872 (2008) (discussing the manifest disregard of law standard).
130. See Hoeft, 343 F.3d. at 64; Meriwether, supra note 116, at 761.
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a lack of elementary procedural fairness, corruption, or similar miscon-
duct,"'13 clearly indicating the Second Circuit's focus on protecting the
parties' due process rights when faced with complete contractual waiver of
the right to juridical review and of the right to have an award set aside.
The same emphasis on protection remained prominent in the Tenth
Circuit's decision in MACTEC, Inc. v. Gorelick. Unlike Hoeft, in which the
Second Circuit considered a set of facts in which parties had completely
waived judicial review in their arbitration clause, the Tenth Circuit in Gore-
lick was faced with a case where the parties had not entirely waived or
eliminated judicial review of the award.132 Rather, the provision agreed to
by the parties stated that "[j]udgment upon the award rendered by the arbi-
trator shall be final and nonappealable and may be entered in any court
having jurisdiction thereof."' 33 Notably, the provision in this case did not
eliminate all judicial review because it bound the parties to the judgment of
the trial court. Because the provision did not eliminate all judicial review,
the Tenth Circuit upheld the provision, holding that parties are allowed to
contractually eliminate appellate-level review.' 34
In Gorelick, like in Hoeft, the court considered whether the parties
were adequately protected under the rule. The Gorelick court, however,
based its decision on the requirement that the limited review rule does not
conflict "with the federal policies furthered by the FAA."1 35 In addition to
the fundamental policy of reducing litigation costs by providing a more
efficient forum, another important policy concern is ensuring that arbitra-
tion awards enforced by courts are not procedurally unfair or defective.136
This statutory goal of avoiding procedurally unfair or defective awards
serves to protect parties from the risks inherent in arbitration proceedings.
In sum, despite the Hoeft and Gorelick courts' different methods of analysis,
the courts' emphasis on protecting the parties and the judicial system dem-
onstrates an underlying policy of protection in the United States.
b. Automatic Waiver and U.S. Policy and Law
The concept of an automatic waiver of the right to set aside an arbitra-
tion award is inconsistent with U.S. law on contractual waiver of set-aside
and the policy of protecting parties and courts that has driven that body of
law. First, if parties automatically waive the right to set aside an award,
then the courts-who must still confirm the award-would have no choice
131. See Hoeft, 343 F.3d. at 64; Meriwether, supra note 116, at 761; see also Gill, supra
note 91, at 650 (noting that Congress, when enacting the FAA, sought to "balance the
importance of a flexible dispute resolution system with the need to prevent patently
unfair arbitration awards by delineating specific safeguards in section 10(a)").
132. See Meriwether, supra note 116, at 762.
133. See MACTEC, Inc. v. Gorelick, 427 F.3d 821, 827 (10th Cir. 2005).
134. See id. at 829-30 (distinguishing Gorelick from Hoeft); see also Gill, supra note
91, at 651; Meriwether, supra note 116, at 762-63.
135. See Gorelick, 427 F.3d at 829 (citing Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d
925, 935 (10th Cir. 2001)); see also Meriwether, supra note 116, at 763.
136. See Gorelick, 427 F.3d at 829 (mentioning costs and efficiency and referring to
the "policy concerns implicated by Hoeft"); see also Meriwether, supra note 116, at 763.
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but to function as "rubber stamps."1 37 Indeed, if set-aside proceedings
were no longer an option, courts would be forced to confirm unfair and
defective awards absent allegations that the entire contract was invalid due
to fraud, coercion or duress.138
Second, where there is an automatic waiver of set-aside there is argua-
bly even less protection-or more risk to parties-than with a contractual
waiver of set-aside. When parties expressly contract to waive set-aside, they
presumably had a fair opportunity during negotiations to weigh the conse-
quences of that waiver. After all, despite the discussion above about par-
ties' failure to recognize tactical advantages and pitfalls, parties that
expressly waive set-aside must add that provision to the standard arbitra-
tion clause. In consciously giving up the right to set-aside, parties likely
take into account the consequences that could stem from that decision if a
court issues an unfavorable award against them; the monetary conse-
quences are perhaps more readily apparent to parties than, for example,
the consequences of choosing one U.S. jurisdiction over another. Con-
versely, in the case of automatic waiver, the parties would need foresight to
anticipate such consequences when choosing the seat of arbitration; and
indeed, as this Note has already discussed, parties drafting agreements do
not always take into account tactical opportunities and pitfalls of choosing
a certain seat.139 Therefore, an automatic waiver might provide less protec-
tion than a contractual waiver simply due to the parties' lack of foresight
regarding when an automatic waiver could be imposed and current atti-
tudes towards drafting arbitration clauses.
In addition, and on a more basic level, the concept of an automatic
waiver of set-aside-which completely eliminates set-aside proceedings and
consequently eliminates judicial review of the award-is in direct conflict
with the current state of the law wherein complete contractual waiver of
set-aside and judicial review will not be enforced by courts.140 Given this
incompatibility of the automatic waiver with U.S. law concerning the issue
of contractual waiver of set-aside and the policies underlying that law, the
courts should resolve the circuit split to reflect the state of the law in the
Second Circuit, where the rule does not result in an automatic waiver.
2. The Automatic Waiver Is at Odds with the International Focus on
Autonomy
a. The Modern International View Promotes Autonomy
While U.S. policies and law advocating for a resolution in favor of the
Second Circuit should factor in heavily in deciding how the circuit split is
resolved, it is important to recognize that the policy of autonomy that has
driven the set-aside waiver laws of several European states also speaks
against the introduction of an automatic waiver. Indeed, contrary to the
137. See Hoeft v. MVL Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2003).
138. See generally Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA), 9 U.S.C § 10; New York
Convention, supra note 15, art. V.
139. See supra Part I.A.
140. Compare supra Part II.B.1.a, with supra Part I.D.3.
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United States, several European countries have codified their laws relating
to the contractual waiver of set-aside, and in the countries that have done
so, the law overwhelmingly allows for parties to contractually waive the
right to set aside an award.14 1 Note, however, that these European laws
only speak to contractual waiver of set-aside and that these countries have
not addressed the issue of automatic set-aside.142
One example of the European approach to contractual waiver of set-
aside is Article 1522 of the new French arbitration law,143 which came into
effect on January 13, 2011. The French law allows parties to waive the
right to have the award set aside in front of French courts where the seat of
arbitration was in France. This waiver must be clearly expressed in a "spe-
cific agreement."' 44 However, the article also states that even if the parties
agreed to waive the right to set-aside proceedings, the parties can still chal-
lenge the enforcement of an award in France on any of the five grounds for
annulment in the French Arbitration Act.145 Therefore, the French law
allows for parties to challenge the enforcement of the award in France, even
if the validity of the award cannot be challenged because parties waived the
right to set-aside.146
Unlike the French law, the other European laws that allow for waiver
of set-aside proceedings require the parties to have no link to the seat of
arbitration. For example, Article 192 of the Swiss Private International
Law Act allows parties to waive the right to set aside proceedings where the
seat of arbitration has been in Switzerland only if the waiver is expressly
stated and if neither of the parties is domiciled in Switzerland, has a habit-
141. See, e.g., Bundesgesetz iber das Internationale Privatrecht [IPRG] [Swiss Private
International Law Act], Dec. 18, 1987, SR 291, art. 192.
142. To the knowledge of the author, none of the European laws consider automatic
waiver of set-aside. See, e.g., id. (no mention of automatic waiver).
143. See Loi 2011-48 du 13 janvier 2011 portant r6forme de larbitrage [Decree No.
2011-48 of 13 January 2011 reforming the law governing arbitration], JOURNAL OFFICIEL
DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE U.O1 (OractAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan 14, 2011, p. 777.
The text of Article 1522 of the new French arbitration law states:
Par convention speciale, les parties peuvent A tout moment renoncer express&
ment au recours en annulation. Dans ce cas, elles peuvent toujours faire appel
de l'ordonnance d'exequatur pour l'un des motifs privus A larticle 1520.
L'appel est forme dans le dlai d'un mois i compter de la notification de la
sentence revetue de l'exequatur. La notification est faite par voie de significa-
tion A moins que les parties en conviennent autrement.
The official English translation reads as follows:
By way of a specific agreement the parties may, at any time, expressly waive
their right to bring an action to set aside. Where such right has been waived, the
parties nonetheless retain their right to appeal an enforcement order on one of
the grounds set forth in Article 1520. Such appeal shall be brought within one
month following notification of the award bearing the enforcement order. The
award bearing the enforcement order shall be notified by service (signification),
unless otherwise agreed by the parties.
Id., translated in French Decree of 13 Jan. 2011, INT'L ARB. INST. PARIs, http://www.
iaiparis.com/pdf/FRENCHLAWONARBITRATION.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2012).
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.; see also JONES DAY, supra note 86, at 4.
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ual residence in Switzerland, or has a business establishment in Switzer-
land.147 Similarly, § 51 of the Swedish Arbitration Act permits parties to
expressly waive the right to set-aside if neither of the parties is domiciled or
has its place of business in Sweden.' 48 However, while the Swiss and
Swedish laws have requirements about the parties' links to Switzerland and
Sweden, these requirements do not necessarily limit parties' ability to
waive set-aside beyond the French law, because often the seat of arbitration
147. See Bundesgesetz uber das Internationale Privatrecht [IPRG] [Swiss Private Inter-
national Law Act] Dec. 18, 1987, SR 291, art. 192. The text of Article 192 of the Swiss
Private International Law Act states:
X. Verzicht auf Rechtsmittel
1. Hat keine der Parteien Wohnsitz, gewohnlichen Aufenthalt oder eine
Niederlassung in der Schweiz, so konnen sie durch eine ausdruickliche
Erklirung in der Schiedsvereinbarung oder in einer spiteren schriftlichen Ober-
einkunft die Anfechtung der Schiedsentscheide vollstandig ausschliessen; sie
konnen auch nur einzelne Anfechtungsgruinde gemAss Artikel 190 Absatz 2
ausschliessen.
2. Haben die Parteien eine Anfechtung der Entscheide vollstAndig ausgeschlos-
sen und sollen die Entscheide in der Schweiz vollstreckt werden, so gilt das New
Yorker Obereinkommen vom 10. Juni 1958 uber die Anerkennung und Voll-
streckung auslAndischer Schiedsspruche sinngemiAss.
The official English translation reads as follows:
X. Waiver of annulment
1. If none of the parties have their domicile, their habitual residence, or a busi-
ness establishment in Switzerland, they may, by an express statement in the
arbitration agreement or by a subsequent written agreement, waive fully the
action for annulment or they may limit it to one or several of the grounds listed
in Art. 190, subsection 2.
2. If the parties have waived fully the action for annulment and if the award is to
be enforced in Switzerland, the New York Convention of June 10, 1958 on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards applies by analogy.
Id., translated in SWITZERLAND'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw STATUTE OF DECEMBER 18,
1987 165 (Pierre A. Karrer & Karl W. Arnold trans., Kluwer Law and Taxation Publish-
ers 1989) (1987).
148. See 51 § LAG OM SKILJEFORFARANDE (Svensk forfattningssamling [SFS] 1999:116).
Section 51 of the Swedish Arbitration Act states:
Har inte nAgon av parterna hemvist eller driftstdlle i Sverige, fAr de i ett kommer-
siellt forhAllande genom en uttrycklig skriftlig overenskommelse utesluta eller
begrAnsa tillimpligheten av de grunder for upphAvande av en skiljedom som
anges i 34 §. En skiljedom som omfattas av en sAdan overenskommelse erkanns
och verkstAlls i Sverige enligt de regler som galler f6r en utlandsk skiljedom.
The official translation reads as follows:
Where none of the parties is domiciled or has its place of business in Sweden,
such parties may in a commercial relationship through an express written agree-
ment exclude or limit the application of the grounds for setting aside an award
as are set forth in section 34. An award which is subject to such an agreement
shall be recognised and enforced in Sweden in accordance with the rules appli-
cable to a foreign award.
Id., translated in The Swedish Arbitration Act (SFS 1999:116), ARB. INST. STOCKHOLM
CHAMBER COM., http://www.chamber.se/?id=23746 (last visited Nov. 4, 2012).
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is chosen for the purposes of neutrality where neither party has ties to the
seat.149
The crucial commonality between the French, Swiss, and Swedish
laws, however, is that parties can contractually waive the right to set aside
an award arising from arbitration in those countries, provided that the
waiver is clear and explicit. Notably, this requirement that the waiver be
clear and explicit addresses some of the concerns about protecting the par-
ties from unfair and defective awards that worry U.S. courts. Interestingly,
however, even though these foreign laws and statutes take into account
concerns of protecting the parties and their due process rights,o50 the main
policy driving these laws is not protection.
Rather, the main policy behind the French, Swiss, and Swedish laws'
permissive approach to contractual waiver of set-aside is the promotion of
party autonomy.151 The PricewaterhouseCoopers study found that the
most important advantage of arbitration for in-house counsel was the flexi-
bility and the autonomy inherent in the arbitration process.152 In the same
vein, the official French commentary on the new law noted that the ability
to waive set-aside proceedings can be useful,153 and this runs tandem with
the in-house counsels' preference for the flexibility to choose provisions,
such as a waiver of set-aside, that they deem useful for their company's
arbitration goals and strategy.' 54
Academic commentators have explained the European regimes' focus
on autonomy-and the consequent liberal attitude towards contractual set-
aside-using the theory of "denationalization of international arbitra-
tion."' 55 Specifically, these countries reform and modernize their arbitra-
tion laws to focus on autonomy by "curtail[ing] national court involvement
in international commercial arbitration."' 5 6 While no state has entirely
denationalized international commercial arbitration, some of the more
modern states have "effectively incorporated denationalized arbitration
149. See WHITE& CASE, 2010 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: CHOICES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL ARBITRATION 17-20, available at http://www.whitecase.com/files/upload/file
Repository/20 1 OlnternationalArbitrationSurveyChoices inInternationalArbitra-
tion.pdf (finding that the most important factor for practitioners choosing the seat of
arbitration was the formal legal infrastructure of the seat, which includes neutrality and
impartiality).
150. See, e.g., JONES DAY, supra note 86, at 4.
151. See id. (noting that the ability to waive annulment proceedings increases party
autonomy).
152. See supra Part L.A and the sources cited therein.
153. See Rapport au Premier ministre relatif au d&cret no 2011-48 du 13 janvier 2011
portant r6forme de l'arbitrage [Report to the Prime Minister on the Decree No. 2011-48
of January 13, 2011 to reform arbitration], JoURNAL OFFICIAL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRAN4AISE
[JO.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 14, 2011, p. 177.
154. See INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 2006, supra
note 2, at 3.
155. See Behrens, supra note 2, at 20.
156. See KATHERINE LYNCH, THE FORCES OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: CHALLENGES TO
THE REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 279 (2003) (using the examples
of Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, and Tunisia, all of which permit contractual waiver of
set-aside).
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detached from the scrutiny and regulation of the national court sys-
tems."157 Applying this theory to the concept of contractual waiver of set-
aside, national courts have less influence in the process of arbitration
when such a provision is included in the arbitration clause, because the
courts will only be able to enforce the award and will not be able to scruti-
nize it on its merits. However, it should be noted that because the courts
must enforce the award, they are not completely isolated from the arbitra-
tion process. Interestingly, this denationalization of arbitration that char-
acterizes the European regimes' approach runs contrary to the U.S. courts'
concerns about contractual waiver of set-aside rendering the courts mere
rubber stamps and possibly explains the stark differences between the U.S.
and European approaches to contractual waiver of set-aside.
Furthermore, academics have noted that this focus on denationaliza-
tion and autonomy aims to attract a greater share of the lucrative arbitra-
tion business by making their country a more attractive seat for
arbitration.158 In support of this assertion, following the reform of the
French arbitration law in 2011, numerous law firms noted in their client
alerts and commentaries that the new French law-especially its innovative
set-aside waiver provision-increases party autonomy and makes France a
more attractive seat for arbitration.' 59 In addition, the French Justice Min-
ister, Michel Mercier, confirmed in an interview that "one of the aims of
the new law is to maintain the leading role of Paris as a seat for interna-
tional arbitration and to ensure that the ICC, including its Court of Arbitra-
tion, maintains its headquarters in France."160
157. See id. at 279, 282.
158. See id.; see also Behrens, supra note 2, at 37-38 (noting that "[i]t should further-
more not be forgotten that arbitration is a business in itself. The stakes are high....
[D]ifferences in national regulation of arbitration generate intense international compe-
tition between arbitration centers. Such competition leads to national deregulation of
the arbitration process.").
159. See JONES DAY, supra note 86, at 4 (noting the increase in autonomy); see also
Michael Ostrove & Theobald Naud, France Reforms its Arbitration Law, DLA PIPER (Mar.
16, 2011), http://www.dlapiper.com/france-reforms-its-arbitration-law/ (noting that
the new law "indisputably improves the clarity and efficiency of French arbitration law
and will reinforce the position of Paris as a leading arbitration centre"); Herbert Smith,
The New French Arbitration Law, JAPAN Dise. AVOIDANCE NEWSL., (on file with author)
("[T]his waiver option aims to modernise French law by giving greater autonomy to
parties."); Norton Rose, New French Arbitration Law Reflects a Boldly Liberal Approach,
INT'L ARB. (Feb. 2011), http://www.nortonrose.com/files/intemational-arbitration-new-
french-arbitration-law-reflects-a-boldly-liberal-approach-pdf-762-kb-34983.pdf (noting
that the law "to a very great extent . . . has achieved the objective of innovating, simplify-
ing and strengthening French arbitration law-and also of reinforcing the attraction of
Paris as a seat of choice for conducting arbitral proceedings"); Christoph von Krause et.
al., Alerts: New French Arbitration Law, WHITE & CASE (Jan. 2011), http://www.white-
case.com/alerts-01202011/ (hailing the new law as "enhancing France as one of the
most arbitration friendly jurisdictions in the world").
160. See John V.H. Pierce, Gary Born & Maxi Scherer, Revision to French Arbitration
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b. Automatic Waiver and International Policy
Just as the concept of automatic waiver is incompatible with the U.S.
policy of protection, it is similarly incompatible with the European policy
of autonomy. It is true that with an automatic waiver national courts do
not regulate the arbitration and do not scrutinize the award, thus reflecting
the European movement towards denationalization of arbitration. How-
ever, it is questionable whether the European liberal approach towards
waiver of set-aside-and the consequent minimal court involvement-
would reach to an automatic waiver, as a cornerstone of the French, Swiss,
and Swedish waiver laws is the requirement that the waiver be clear and
explicit.161 With an automatic waiver, such a requirement-that effectively
acts as a safeguard of the parties' due process rights-is not possible. Even
more significantly, the denationalization of arbitration rests heavily on the
concept of party autonomy. However, with an automatic waiver, parties
are stripped of the opportunity to choose whether they want to waive the
right to set-aside, effectively negating the flexibility that the opportunity for
contractual waiver of set-aside provides.162 Furthermore, insofar as the
requirement that the waiver be explicit can be viewed as a safeguard of
party autonomy by serving to demonstrate that the parties are making a
conscious choice, an automatic waiver similarly fails in that function by
not requiring explicit consent. Given that both the policies of protection
and autonomy that have driven set-aside waiver laws in the United States
and Europe, respectively, are incompatible with the concept of an auto-
matic waiver of set-aside, the courts should resolve the circuit split in favor
of the Second Circuit's rule.
C. Time to Modernize and Simplify: Making the United States a More
Attractive Seat for Arbitration
While many international jurisdictions have focused on autonomy
when drawing up their set-aside waiver laws, the United States has empha-
sized the need to protect the parties and the integrity of the judicial sys-
tem. 163 Even if the U.S. Supreme Court were to resolve the circuit split to
eliminate the possibility of an automatic waiver of the right to set aside an
award in the Eleventh Circuit, the United States should also modernize its
laws and allow contractual waiver of set-aside to reflect a commitment to
party autonomy. The United States' current policy focus on protection in
set-aside waiver law, while understandable, is not only at odds with the
more modern and liberal arbitration regimes advocating autonomy, but
also at odds with the focus on the freedom of contract that pervades other
aspects of U.S. arbitration law.164 Furthermore, if the United States were
to increase its focus on autonomy and allow for contractual waiver of set-
161. See supra Part II.B.2.a (discussing the French, Swiss and Swedish laws' require-
ment that the waiver be explicit).
162. See INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 2006, supra
note 2, at 2.
163. See supra Part Il.B.1.
164. Comparesupra Part II.B.1 with supra Part II.B.2. and infra Part II.C.1.
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aside, it would reinforce its position as an attractive and popular seat for
arbitration, thus potentially bringing to the United States a bigger share of
the lucrative arbitration business that the European arbitration regimes are
similarly seeking with their liberal arbitration laws.165
1. Refocusing on Freedom of Contract
U.S. law should shift its focus to autonomy in set-aside waiver law and
allow parties to contractually waive the right to set-aside proceedings,
because in areas of arbitration law not relating to waiver of set-aside or the
limitation and expansion of judicial review, U.S. legislators and courts
have already noted and adhered to the importance of freedom of contract
principles. First, the legislative history of the FAA indicates that the pur-
pose of the Act was the specific enforcement of arbitration agreements. 166
For example, a House committee report stated that "[alrbitration agree-
ments are purely matters of contract."l 67 According to legislative history,
the purpose of the FAA is to "provide a simple method by which the parties
may be brought before the court in order to give enforcement to that which
they have already agreed to."16 8
Second, U.S. courts have similarly held that freedom of contract prin-
ciples are crucial in arbitration. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford, Jr. Univer-
sity stated that the FAA only provides the right to obtain an order directing
that the arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in the parties'
agreement. 169 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court in Southland Corp. v.
Keating pointed to the fact that as arbitration contracts are negotiated "by
experienced and sophisticated businessmen, . . . absent some compelling
and countervailing reason it should be honored by the parties and
enforced by the courts."1 70 Such legislative and judicial history emphasiz-
ing freedom of contract principles, autonomy, and the strict enforcement
of party agreements regarding arbitration support the argument that agree-
ments providing for waiver of set-aside should be enforced and are not in
conflict with the spirit of the FAA and U.S. arbitration law.
165. See infra Part II.C.2.
166. See Milan Koptsiovsky, Note, A Right to Contract for Judicial Review of an Arbitra-
tion Award: Does Freedom of Contract Apply to Arbitration Agreements?, 36 CONN. L. REv.
609, 614-15 (2004) (discussing the emphasis on freedom of contract principles in U.S.
legislative history and in U.S. case law regarding arbitration).
167. See id. at 614 (discussing and citing H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924)).
168. See id. (discussing and citing 65 CONG. REc. H1931 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1924)
(statement of Rep. Graham)).
169. See id. at 623 (discussing and citing Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of
Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. University, 489 U.S. 468, 474-75 (1989)).
170. See id. at 624 (discussing and citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7
(1984) (original citation omitted)); but see supra Part II.A (noting that the drafters of
arbitration clauses do not always draft the clauses competently).
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2. Increasing the United States' Attractiveness as a Seat of Arbitration
In addition to legislative history and case law that support moderniz-
ing contractual set-aside waiver law to allow for contractual waiver in the
United States, U.S. law should also allow for contractual waiver of the right
to set-aside proceedings because it will increase the attractiveness of the
United States as a seat of arbitration, as it has done for its European coun-
terparts.171 While the United States is already a popular choice among
corporations as a seat of arbitration,' 7 2 the United States would benefit
from further increasing its attractiveness as a seat of arbitration. Not only
is arbitration a lucrative industry,' 73 but increasing the attractiveness of
the U.S. as a seat also would (1) potentially forge closer links between for-
eign corporations and the United States and (2) increase the arbitration
knowledge and skills of U.S. practitioners who would be exposed to more
arbitration.
Modernizing the contractual set-aside waiver law would increase the
attractiveness of the United States as a seat of arbitration, first and fore-
most because parties will be attracted to the flexibility and autonomy
offered by U.S. laws to create the kind of arbitration proceedings that suit
their arbitration needs and strategy.' 74 Second, the United States will be
more attractive as a seat for arbitration if the law regarding contractual
waiver of set-aside is clarified by increasing its consistency with other
aspects of U.S. arbitration law. Currently, set-aside waiver law is not as
deferential to party agreement as other areas of U.S. arbitration law.175 In
this aspect, the United States could benefit from looking to France's mod-
ernization of its arbitration law, as France reported that its efforts to attract
arbitration to France involved both increased autonomy and a clarification
of its laws that make them more accessible to foreign practitioners drafting
arbitration agreements with France as the seat of arbitration.' 76 Since the
arbitration process can fail to meet parties' expectations due to poor draft-
ing of the clause or because parties did not take into account all legal con-
sequences, strategic opportunities and pitfalls, any additional clarity and
accessibility in the U.S. arbitration law will certainly be a welcome develop-
ment to everyone who has to draft international commercial arbitration
clauses.
Conclusion
This Note recommends that the circuit split between the Second and
Eleventh Circuits, which logically results in an automatic waiver of the
right to set-aside proceedings when an arbitration in the Eleventh Circuit
171. See sources cited in supra note 159.
172. See INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE ATrITUDES AND PRACTICEs 2006, supra
note 2, at 3.
173. See Behrens, supra note 2, at 37-38.
174. See supra Part L.A and the sources cited therein.
175. See supra Part II.C.1.
176. See sources cited in supra note 159.
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results in a foreign or non-domestic award, should be resolved in favor of
the Second Circuit's rule. This Note argues that while an automatic waiver
is compatible with some of the benefits of arbitration and assuages some of
the inherent concerns, it is fundamentally incompatible with the policies
of protection and autonomy, which have dictated contractual set-aside
waiver law in the United States and abroad, respectively. Furthermore, this
Note recommends that even if the courts were to resolve the split to elimi-
nate the possibility of an automatic waiver, Congress and the Supreme
Court should allow contractual set-aside to increase the consistency of U.S.
arbitration law and the attractiveness of the United States as a seat of
arbitration.
While this Note explores the concept of an automatic waiver, this Note
at its core argues that because drafting arbitration clauses poses unique
challenges by affecting both the procedure and outcome of arbitration,
there is no need to further complicate the process. Unfortunately, in the
United States the process has been complicated by a complex legal regime
that is inconsistent with the policies surrounding arbitration and that can
surprise parties with undesired and expensive consequences. Price-
waterhouseCoopers' study noted that 95% of in-house counsel expected to
use international commercial arbitration as their method of cross-border
dispute resolution, and they expect the number of such cases to
increase. 177 Unless complex laws such as those resulting in the circuit
split discussed in this Note are simplified and made more uniform, it is
increasingly likely that as more parties resort to arbitration they will end
up in a losing situation like our hypothetical U.S. chain and its interna-
tional investors. In our hypothetical, it is entirely possible that the U.S.
chain and the international investors chose to arbitrate in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit. It is also possible that due to the attorneys' oversight or lack of under-
standing of tactical advantages when drafting the clause the U.S. chain
would be on the hook for $40 million with no recourse through set-aside
proceedings. Furthermore, what adds insult to the U.S. chain's injury is
the fact that the theoretical arbitration proceedings were unfair: the U.S.
chain was not given a full and fair chance to be heard before the $40 mil-
lion award was rendered. If this situation were to occur in reality, no expla-
nation of the attorneys' shortcomings or the fact that it is industry practice
to rely on a standard clause will be of much comfort to the U.S. chain. In
fact, it is not too far of a stretch to say that losing recourse to set-aside
proceedings would lead the U.S. chain to launch a warranted malpractice
suit against its attorneys.
177. See INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 2006, supra
note 2, at 3.
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